Court of Appeals Division I
State of Washington

Opinion Information Sheet

Docket Number: 52920-0-I
Title of Case: STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent - Cross AppVS
WALLIN, JAMIE LLOYD, Appellant - Cross Resp
File Date: 02/07/2005

Appeal from Superior Court of Snohomish County
Docket No: 03-1-00760-3
Judgment or order under review
Date filed: 07/31/2003
Judge signing: Hon. Ronald X Castleberry

Authored by Ronald Cox
Concurring: Ann Schindler
H Joseph Coleman

Counsel for Appellant/Cross-Respondent
Washington Appellate Project
Attorney at Law
Cobb Building
1305 4th Avenue, Ste 802
Seattle, WA 98101

Gregory Charles Link
Washington Appellate Project
1511 3rd Ave Ste 701
Seattle, WA 98101-3635

J Wallin - Informational only (Appearing Pro Se)
1226 6 St
Marysville, WA 98270

Counsel for Respondent/Cross-Appellant
Seth Aaron Fine
Attorney at Law
Snohomish Co Pros Ofc
3000 Rockefeller Ave
Everett, WA 98201-4060


Respondent, ) DIVISION ONE
v. )
Appellant. ) FILED: February 7,
) 2005

COX, C.J. - At issue in this appeal is whether a warrantless search by
Department of Corrections (DOC) officers of the home of Jamie Wallin was
done 'without authority of law' as prohibited by article 1, section 7 of
the Washington Constitution. We are constrained to hold that the search
was without authority of law and thus violates the state constitution. The
evidence obtained by virtue of the search must be suppressed. Accordingly,
we reverse.
In 1994, Jamie Wallin pleaded guilty to one count of first degree
child molestation and the court sentenced him under a Special Sex Offender
Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA). The charging period for the crime was July
2, 1988 to January 8, 1990. The SSOSA was subsequently revoked in March
1996, and Wallin was ordered to serve a 51 month sentence with one year of
community placement upon release. Wallin was released from prison on April
29, 1998. On March 22, 1999, Wallin violated his community placement by
repeatedly asking out a 16 year old girl who worked at a local espresso
stand. Wallin frequented the establishment, lingering to chat with the
girl, and bringing her cards and gifts. One condition of his community
placement required that Wallin have no contact with minors without the
approval of his CCO, or without the presence of an approved adult. As a
result, the court modified Wallin's sentence, imposing 60 days of
confinement and extending the period of community placement to ten years,
the statutory maximum for his crime.1
All parties present at these proceedings apparently believed the court
had the power to extend Wallin's community placement under former RCW
9.94A.120(10)(c). During the hearing, the DOC officer recommended that the
court extend the order prohibiting contact with the victim. The DOC
officer said '{M}y primary emphasis here is on no contact with {the
victim}. {U}nder the law the court can extend the time past the active
supervision period that no contact can occur ' The defense requested that
the court impose time served for the violation or, in the alternative, that
Wallin be granted work release. Neither the prosecuting attorney nor the
DOC officer objected to those terms. In that context, the defense attorney
noted '{we} have no objection to extending supervision or the jurisdiction
and certainly no objection to having no contact whatsoever with {the
victim} or her family ' Ultimately, the court denied work release,
imposing 60 days of confinement, a no contact with the victim order, and
extending community supervision 'for the maximum statutory period.'
In March 2003, a neighbor telephoned the police to complain that
Wallin had been taking pictures of her teenage nieces from his apartment
window. The police spoke with Wallin, who denied taking photographs and
showed the officers his blank digital camera. The police reported the
incident to Wallin's CCO, who felt that, given his history, the incident
was a strong indication that Wallin was violating the terms of his
community placement. As a result, several CCOs visited Wallin and searched
his home and computer. The CCOs did not have a warrant. After finding
large numbers of images on Wallin's computer which appeared to be minors in
sexually suggestive poses and activities, the officers contacted the
Marysville police and arrested Wallin. Relying on information obtained
from the CCOs, police officers obtained a warrant to search the home,
computer, and media storage devices.
Officers discovered thousands of images portraying minors in sexually
suggestive poses or activities in the computer. Among these were a number
of homemade photographs which were identified as having been taken with a
Sony Cyber Shot camera. A detective recalled seeing such a camera in
Wallin's home when the search warrant was executed.
A second warrant was obtained to search for and seize the camera. But
family members had removed it, along with other valuable items, from the
apartment for safekeeping. Police spoke with Wallin's grandparents who did
not have the camera, but who took the officer's contact information. A few
hours later, Wallin's father contacted the police and volunteered to turn
over the camera he had removed from the apartment.
Police discovered a number of additional photographs on the camera's
memory stick, including the homemade images discovered on the computer.
The homemade images included photographs of an adult male's penis next to
or penetrating the vagina of a minor female.
After the discovery of these photos, police interviewed Wallin about
them. Wallin eventually admitted that he was the adult male in the
photographs. He also admitted to having sexual contact with the nine year
girl in the photos, whom he identified.
The State charged Wallin with first degree rape of a child, first
degree child molestation, sexual exploitation of a minor, and possession of
depictions of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Wallin moved
to suppress the fruits of the corrections officers' initial search of his
apartment, including the computer, the camera, and his statement. Wallin
argued that the 1999 order was invalid because the statute permitting
extension of community placement only applied to offenses committed after
July 1996, and did not apply to his offense. Thus, he contended, the CCOs
lacked authority to conduct a warrantless search of his apartment.
The trial judge denied the motion, concluding the 1999 order was
facially valid and the corrections officers were entitled to rely on it.
Following a stipulated bench trial, the court found Wallin guilty as
charged. The court sentenced Wallin to life without the possibility of
parole, finding that because of his 1994 conviction, the current
convictions qualified him as a persistent offender.
Wallin appeals.

Wallin argues that the evidence used to convict him was obtained in
violation of the federal and state constitutions and should have been
suppressed at trial. Specifically, Wallin contends that the order
extending his community supervision beyond the statutory period was invalid
on its face, providing no legal authority for the initial warrantless
search and, as such, the officers were not entitled to rely upon it. We
hold that the order did not provide authority of law for the warrantless
'A search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant, or else meet one of
the exceptions to the warrant requirement.'2 As a general rule, our state
constitution provides greater protection than does the federal constitution
against warrantless searches and seizures.3 Therefore, our analysis begins
with article 1, section 7 of the state constitution.
The State has the burden to show that a warrantless search falls into
one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement.4 This court
reviews de novo conclusions of law from an order pertaining to the
suppression of evidence.5
There is no dispute that the DOC officers who conducted the initial
search of Wallin's home did so without a warrant. Moreover, the State does
not dispute the trial court's findings that the computer, camera,
photographic images and Wallin's subsequent confession were fruits of the
initial warrantless search.
'Private Affairs'
Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution provides that
'{n}o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home
invaded, without authority of law.' The provision has two main components:
'private affairs' and 'authority of law.'6 A disturbance of a person's
private affairs usually occurs when the government intrudes upon 'those
privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be
entitled to hold, safe from government trespass.'7 Determining a
constitutional violation turns on whether the State has unreasonably
intruded into a person's 'private affairs.'8 'Thus, the first step is to
determine whether the claimed privacy interest is one that has been
recognized in our state.'9 Both parties agree that a probationer has a
lessened expectation of privacy and may be searched on the basis of a 'well-
founded suspicion' or a 'reasonable suspicion' of a parole violation.10
Wallin's status at the time of the search is crucial to analyzing the
reasonableness of the CCO search under the circumstances. Wallin argues
that since his community placement had actually expired in 1999, he was no
longer a probationer at the time of the CCO search. Therefore, the lower
standard of 'reasonable suspicion' did not apply. Consequently, the
legality of the search is dependent on the validity of the 1999 order
extending Wallin's community placement.
Wallin argues that the 1999 order was invalid on its face and, as such, it
could not bestow authority for the search. The State maintains, however,
that the CCO search of Wallin's home was lawful because the 1999 order
provided the 'authority of law' required by the Washington State
Constitution. According to the State, the DOC officers had not only the
duty, but the obligation to enforce the order until it was modified by a
At the time the trial court extended Wallin's community placement in
March 1999, for 'the maximum statutory period,' no legal authority granted
it the power to do so. The statute in effect at the time, former RCW
9.94A.120(10)(a), provided for the imposition of community custody for a
'sex offense committed on or after June 6, 1996.'11 Former RCW
9.94A.120(10)(c) read, in relevant part:
At any time prior to the completion of a sex offender's term of community
custody, if the court finds that public safety would be enhanced, the court
may impose and enforce an order extending any or all of the conditions
imposed pursuant to this section for a period up to the maximum allowable
sentence for the crime as it is classified in chapter 9A.20 RCW, regardless
of the expiration of the offender's term of community custody.{12}

The authority to so extend community placement terms did not apply to
offenses committed prior to 1996. According to former RCW 9.94A.120(9)(a),
'{w}hen a court sentences {an offender} for a sex offense committed after
July 1, 1988, but before July 1, 1990, the court shall sentence the
offender to a one-year term of community placement beginning either upon
completion of the term of confinement '13
In State v. Barnett, the supreme court considered the community supervision
sentence of a defendant convicted of armed first degree robbery.14 The
statute permitted community supervision for certain convictions
constituting 'crimes against persons.' The court determined that on the
facts in Barnett, the crime was not one covered by the community placement
statute. Therefore, the trial court exceeded its authority when it imposed
community placement. The court invalidated the community placement portion
of the sentence on the ground that '{a} trial court may only impose a
sentence which is authorized by statute.'15
The defendant in In re Carle pleaded guilty to first degree armed
robbery, and his sentence included a deadly weapon enhancement.16
Subsequent to the defendant's sentencing, the supreme court held in another
case that the deadly weapon enhancement was not applicable in the same
circumstances. The court found the enhanced sentence exceeded the maximum
allowed under the statute, holding '{w}hen a sentence has been imposed for
which there is no authority in law, the trial court has the power and duty
to correct the erroneous sentence, when the error is discovered.'17
In Matter of Moore,18 the petitioner had been sentenced, pursuant to a
plea bargain, to life without the possibility of parole for first degree
aggravated murder.19 The supreme court held the maximum sentence allowed by
statute was life with the possibility of parole, and that the petitioner
was entitled to relief because the sentence imposed was in excess of
statutory authority. The court remanded for resentencing, noting that 'a
defendant cannot agree to be punished more than the Legislature has allowed
The State maintains that State v. McFarland21 controls the analysis. In
McFarland, the defendant was tried, without counsel, in municipal court and
sentenced to jail. Reporting to jail he was subjected to a routine booking
search that uncovered illegal drugs. He was then prosecuted and convicted
on a drug possession charge. On appeal, the supreme court assumed the
municipal court conviction was void, because McFarland had been denied his
constitutional right to counsel, but nevertheless found the search valid.
While McFarland analyzed the effect of a void sentence on the subsequent
search under the federal constitution, applying reasoning similar to the
Fourth Amendment good faith exception, neither the majority nor the dissent
mentions article 1, section 7. Therefore, McFarland is not helpful in a
state constitutional analysis.
The State further argues that because correctional authorities have no
power to modify criminal sentences and are required to enforce them, those
sentences provide the authority of law for enforcement actions. The State
relies on In re Chapman where a sentencing court entered judgment providing
the sentence would be concurrent to a previous sentence.22 Believing the
court lacked authority to do this, the parole board ran the sentences
consecutively.23 The supreme court criticized the board for defying what was
in fact a valid order.24 The legislature subsequently provided procedures
for the DOC to challenge sentences it believed were erroneous to prevent it
from being in the position of 'disregarding the judgment or enforcing what
the department believes to be an erroneous sentence.'25
Neither Chapman, nor the other cases the State cites to support this
argument, are on point. In Chapman, the supreme court strongly chastised
the DOC for refusing to enforce a valid court order. A crucial distinction
between Chapman and this case is that, unlike the Chapman order, the order
extending Wallin's community placement was not, in fact, valid. Moreover,
to say that the DOC has no choice but to enforce valid orders tells us
nothing about the actual authority the DOC possesses in enforcing invalid
This case makes it quite clear that the DOC officers searching Wallin's
computer reasonably believed they had the authority to do so. The judge
who entered the order, the prosecuting attorney, the defense counsel, the
DOC officer present at the hearing, and even Wallin himself, believed the
order to be valid when it was entered. There is no suggestion that anyone
believed the order to be invalid at any time before Wallin first raised the
issue in his suppression motion. The police, when contacted were, in fact,
conscientious in obtaining warrants for subsequent searches. There is no
suggestion in the record that either the DOC officers or the police took a
single misstep, nor that they acted in anything but good faith. But
article 1, section 7, as currently read by our state supreme court, demands
more than belief, and indeed more than good faith. It demands existing
authority of law, and none existed here.
In In re Hilborn,26 another case cited by the State, the court held
that the DOC lacked standing to challenge the defendant's suspended
sentence because it did not comply with the procedural requirements for
seeking such a review under former RCW 9.94A.210(7). The court noted that
since the statute exists for the benefit of the DOC and departs from
traditional principles in permitting the DOC to seek review when the
prosecutor has chosen not to, the statutory requirements are strictly
observed.27 Beyond that, the court specifically declined to consider
whether the DOC was estopped from arguing the illegality of a sentence a
DOC officer had recommended. The court also declined to reach the issue of
whether the sentence itself was illegal.28 That case is not helpful to our
analysis here.
Finally, the State relies on In re Chatman. In that case, the trial court
found the defendant, who was convicted of two counts of burglary, to be
chemically dependent. As a result, the court suspended a portion of the
sentence, and imposed community placement dependent on his participation in
an in-patient drug rehabilitation program.29 A DOC records manager informed
the judge that the court had no authority to suspend a portion of an
inmate's sentence, but the judge refused to correct the sentence unless
directed to do so by an appellate court. The DOC challenged the sentence
under RCW 9.94A.210. The court of appeals determined the judge did indeed
lack statutory authority; the court also found that the DOC had complied
with the statute by exhausting all attempts to resolve the dispute at the
trial court level before seeking appellate review.30 Accordingly, the court
remanded remanded the case for resentencing. The focus of the court was,
as in Hilborn, on whether the DOC had complied with the statute's
procedural requirements in challenging an invalid sentence.31 Neither
Chapman, Hilborn nor Chatman deals with the question of what constitutes
authority of law for the purposes of article 1, section 7, and they cannot
be read to confer such authority on an illegal sentence.
Finally, the State maintains that Wallin had no legitimate expectation
of privacy in the face of an 'apparently valid court order, which he had
never challenged, and which was entered with the approval of his attorney.'32
The trial court similarly reasoned that '{s}upervision may have been
improperly extended. However, the defendant invited the ruling, never
challenged it, and never appealed its validity.'33 The record does not
clearly indicate that Wallin either requested or agreed to the order
extending community placement. Even assuming he did, a defendant's
agreement, even as part of a plea bargain agreement, will not save an
otherwise illegal sentence.34 Similar 'invited error' reasoning has been
rejected by the supreme court on the ground that "a defendant cannot
empower a sentencing court to exceed its statutory authorization."35
The court lacked statutory authority to extend Wallin's community
placement. When his term expired in April 1999, he was no longer a
probationer with a lessened expectation of privacy. The 1999 order was
invalid. The initial search made pursuant to the order but without a
warrant violated article 1, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution.
Wallin claims that, under the rule announced in State v. White,36 an article
I, section 7 violation requires suppression of the evidence obtained as a
result of the unconstitutionality.37 Two years after White, in State v.
Boland, the supreme court said:
In State v. White, we expressed the mandatory nature of the exclusionary
rule in cases where a person's privacy rights under Const. art. 1, sec. 7
have been violated: We think the language of our state constitutional
provision constitutes a mandate that the right of privacy shall not be
diminished by the judicial gloss of a selectively applied exclusionary
remedy. In other words, the emphasis is on protecting personal rights
rather than on curbing governmental actions The important place of the
right to privacy in Const. art. 1, sec. 7 seems to us to require that
whenever the right is unreasonably violated, the remedy must follow. {38}
Again, citing White, the court has held that '{w}hen an
unconstitutional search or seizure occurs, all subsequently uncovered
evidence becomes fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed. Under
article I, section 7, suppression is constitutionally required.'39
In the light of more recent precedent, the absolute exclusionary rule
announced by White cannot be characterized as dicta. Nor is the rule
limited to the facts of that case. White requires that, when an
unreasonable violation of article 1, section 7 is found, the evidence
uncovered as a result of the violation must be suppressed. Wallin's
privacy was unreasonably violated in this case because there was no
authority of law for the order extending his community placement. Thus,
the evidence must be suppressed.
Nonetheless, the State urges us to adopt the reasoning of the
California Court of Appeals in People v. Fields.40 In that case, the
California court refused to apply the exclusionary rule to a search
conducted while the defendant was on probation for a drug conviction. The
drug conviction was later reversed and the court held that admissibility of
evidence should be determined by the probationer's status at the time of
the search since under the facts exclusion served no valid deterrent
function.41 This analysis is similar to the reasoning of McFarland, which
in essence applied the Fourth Amendment good faith exception. Like
McFarland, Fields is simply not helpful in determining admissibility under
our state constitution, particularly because deterrence is not the primary
goal of our state's exclusionary rule.
The State argues that even if the warrantless search was illegal, we
should adopt a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Wallin
argues that no good faith exception can apply in this case.
As a general rule, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.42
Warrantless searches and seizures may, however, be reasonable under 'a few
'jealously and carefully drawn' exceptions{.}'43 The State bears the burden
of showing that a warrantless search falls under an established exception.44
The primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule is the
deterrence of official misconduct.45 Therefore, an exception exists where
police reasonably and in good faith rely on a warrant later deemed invalid.46
Good faith
reliance must still be objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The question is whether a 'reasonably well trained officer would have known
that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization.'47
While the Washington Supreme Court has clearly rejected a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule under our state constitution in White
and we are bound to follow that controlling precedent, the facts of this
case illustrate the need for such an exception.48 Characterizing the
application of the good faith exception in the Fourth Amendment context as
a 'remedial measure for violations,' the state supreme court said:
As a remedial measure, evidence is excluded only when the purposes of the
exclusionary rule can be served. This approach permits the exclusionary
remedy to be completely severed from the right to be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusions. Const. art. 1, sec. 7 differs from this
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in that it clearly recognizes an
individual's right to privacy with no express limitations.{49}

Under a state constitutional analysis, White rejected the good faith
exception interpreting article 1, section 7 to mandate a right to privacy
that shall not be diminished by the gloss of a selectively applied
exclusionary remedy. It is for the supreme court to decide whether it
should re-examine the exclusionary rule in light of the facts of this case.
Regardless of the federal constitutional analysis, no good faith
exception currently applies to the article 1, section 7 analysis.50 As a
result, in the absence of an exception, '{w}henever the right {under
article 1, section 7} is unreasonably violated, the {exclusionary} remedy
must follow.'51
Wallin challenges the life sentence imposed upon him as a persistent
offender. He argues that the State was constitutionally required to charge
Wallin's prior conviction in the information. Because we have decided this
case based on article 1, section 7, we need not reach this issue.
We hold that the warrantless search by DOC officers of Wallin's apartment
was without authority of law and violated article 1, section 7 of the
Washington Constitution. Because the state exclusionary rule is not
subject to a good faith exception, the evidence obtained as a result of the
initial search should have been suppressed at trial.
We reverse the judgment and sentence.


1 At the time Wallin committed the offense, first degree child
molestation was a Class B felony. Effective July 1990, the crime was
reclassified as a Class A felony. Laws of 1990, ch. 3, sec. 902.
2 State v. Carter, 151 Wn.2d 118, 125-26, 85 P.3d 887 (2004)
(citations omitted).
3 Carter, 151 Wn.2d at 125. See also State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173,
179-80, 867 P.2d 593 (1994) (conducting the Gunwall analysis to show that
article 1, section 7 is more protective than the Fourth Amendment).
4 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34, 90 S. Ct. 1969, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409
(1970); State v. Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d 103,111, 960 P.2d 927 (1998).
5 State v. Duncan, 146 Wn.2d 166, 171, 43 P.3d 513 (2002) (citing
State v. Mendez, 137 Wn.2d 208, 214, 970 P.2d 722 (1999)).
6 In re Maxfield, 133 Wn.2d 332, 339-42, 945 P.2d 196 (1997).
7 State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571, 577, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990).
8 State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151 (1984) (citing
State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 178, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980)).
9 Carter, 151 Wn.2d at 126.
10 Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876-878, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 97 L.
Ed. 2d 709 (1987) (finding constitutional the warrantless search of a
probationer's home pursuant to a probationary scheme that itself satisfied
the Fourth Amendment); State v. Lucas, 56 Wn. App. 236, 244, 783 P.2d 121
(1989) (under the Fourth Amendment and article 1, section 7, probationers
and parolees have a diminished right of privacy permitting a warrantless
search if reasonable).
11 RCW 9.94A.120(10)(a) (1998).
12 RCW 9.94A.120(10)(c) (1998) (emphasis added).
13 RCW 9.94A.120(9)(a) (1998) (emphasis added). The State concedes
that the defendant is most likely correct that this statute could not be
applied to crimes committed before 1996.
14 State v. Barnett, 139 Wn.2d 462, 987 P.2d 626 (1999).
15 Barnett, 139 Wn.2d at 464.
16 93 Wn.2d 31, 604 P.2d 1293 (1980).
17 Carle, 93 Wn.2d at 33. See also In re Stoudmire, 141 Wn.2d 342,
354, 5 P.3d 1240 (2000) (determining that a sentence in excess of statutory
authority is a 'fundamental defect' that permits a collateral attack on
sentences in a PRP).
18 116 Wn.2d 30, 803 P.2d 300 (1991).
19 Moore, 116 Wn.2d at 32.
20 Moore, 116 Wn.2d at 38.
21 84 Wn.2d 391, 526 P.2d 361 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005, 95
S. Ct. 1448, 43 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1975).
22 In the Matter of Chapman, 105 Wn.2d 211, 213, 713 P.2d 106 (1986).
23 Chapman, 105 Wn.2d at 213.
24 Chapman, 105 Wn.2d at 216.
25 In re Chatman, 59 Wn. App. 258, 264, 796 P.2d 755 (1990).
26 63 Wn. App. 102, 816 P.2d 1247 (1991), review denied, 118 Wn.2d 1013
27 Hilborn, 63 Wn. App. at 104.
28 Hilborn, 63 Wn. App. at 106.
29 Chatman, 59 Wn. App. at 259.
30 Chatman, 59 Wn. App. at 264-65.
31 Chatman, 59 Wn. App. at 265.
32 (Emphasis added.)
33 Clerk's Papers at 54. Conclusions of Law 8. The trial court found
the court order facially valid, relying on the reasoning in McFarland, and
characterizing Mr. Wallin's attack on the 1999 order as a collateral attack
on the sentence.
34 Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d at 869. See also In re Gardner, 94 Wn.2d 504,
617 P.2d 1001 (1980) ("A plea bargaining agreement cannot exceed the
statutory authority given to the courts.").
35 Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d at 870. See also Matter of Moore, 116 Wn.2d at
36 97 Wn.2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982).
37 Young, 123 Wn.2d at 196; Boland, 115 Wn.2d at 582; White, 97 Wn.2d
at 108-12.
38 Boland, 115 Wn.2d at 582.
39 State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 359, 979 P.2d 833 (1999). See also
State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 4, 726 P.2d 445 (1986).
40 119 Cal. App. 3d 386, 174 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1981).
41 Fields, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 51.
42 State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 70, 917 P.2d 563 (1996).
43 Ladson, 138 Wn.2d at 349.
44 State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 451, 909 P.2d 293 (1996).
45 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L.
Ed. 2d 561 (1974).
46 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed.
2d 677 (1984).
47 Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, n.23.
48 In White, the supreme court noted that in its view even under a
federal constitutional analysis, '{t}he good faith arrest exception is
unworkable and is contrary to well-established Fourth Amendment
principles.' White, 97 Wn.2d at 106.
49 White, 97 Wn.2d at 109-10.
50 See State v. Crawley, 61 Wn. App. 29, 35, 808 P.2d 773 (1991)
(Division 3 noted that '{t}he Washington Supreme Court has not adopted the
{good faith exception} announced in Leon.).
51 White, 97 Wn.2d at 110.